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Summary 
This paper suggests a new model for reliability demonstration of safety-critical systems, 
based on the TRW Software Reliability Theory. The paper describes the model; the test 
equipment required and test strategies based on the various constraints occurring 
during software development. The paper also compares a new testing method, Single 
Risk Sequential Testing (SRST), with the standard Probability Ratio Sequential Testing 
method (PRST), and concludes that: 
• SRST provides higher chances of success than PRST. 
• SRST takes less time to complete than PRST. 
• SRST satisfies the consumer risk criterion, whereas PRST provides a much smaller 
consumer risk than the requirement.  
 
Notation 
 
F  number of failures during reliability demonstration testing 
Fmax maximum allowable number of failures during reliability demonstration testing 
n  number of tests 
n0 the number of tests required for zero-failure demonstration 
nF the number of tests required for reliability demonstration with F failures 
nmax the maximum number of tests which can be performed in Tmax testing hours. 
Tmax the total time available for testing 
t the time left until the deadline [hours] 
T0 the required time for zero-failure demonstration [hours] 
Tave the average duration of a single test 
Tcorr the average time needed in order to find the fault(s), correct them, do the regression 
tests on the new version and return it to statistical testing [hours] 
TF the time required for reliability demonstration with F failures [hours] 
V the number of the current software version 
Vmax the maximum number of new software versions that can still be produced by the 
deadline 
c the required confidence that the probability of a failure during one mission/demand is 
less than θ1 
α producer risk  
β  consumer risk  
θ1 the maximum allowed unreliability corresponding to the customer risk 
θ0 specified unreliability corresponding to the producer risk  
θ  the true unreliability of the system 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
At present there are two generally accepted methods for reliability demonstration testing, i.e. 
fixed-duration testing and sequential testing, as specified by US MIL-HDBK-781A [1].  
Sequential testing, also known as Probability Ratio Sequential Testing (PRST), is more 
efficient in terms of the mean number of tests. Both methods are based on the concepts of 
consumer risk β and producer risk α and on two corresponding unreliability values (a 
specified failure rate and a minimum acceptable failure rate) and tests can be chosen from the 
appropriate operating characteristic curve within US MIL-HDBK 781A based on these four 
criteria. This approach is appropriate for non-safety-critical systems, but it is less appropriate 
for safety-critical systems, because: 
1.    PRSTs within [1] are based on specified and minimum acceptable failure rates. PRSTs 
for software reliability testing may be based on acceptance sampling by attributes where the 
success or failure of a program is more relevant than its time to failure. The background 
theory is described in [2], [3] and [4]. A complete review of software reliability models 
appears in [5]. 
2. In the context of safety-critical systems, the producer risk and the specified failure rate or 
unreliability are not customer requirements. Nevertheless, they do affect the required 
number of tests and the maximum allowed number of failures during the reliability 
demonstration testing. 
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3. While for non-safety-critical systems the producer risk and the consumer risk can be 
interpreted in comparable financial terms, i.e. a financial loss is experienced by consumer 
and producer if the test fails, for safety-critical they usually are not comparable, since a 
failure in such a system can result in extensive non-reversible damage in terms of human 
life and/or environmental effects.    
4. The maximum number of tests for safety-critical systems can be very large for a PRST 
since the testing ends according to two truncation criteria, i.e. a maximum number of tests 
or a maximum number of failures which depend on the four test criteria. The maximum 
number of failures can be very large too, which is undesirable for safety-critical systems. 
2. BACKGROUND  
 
A contract for software reliability/dependability for a safety critical software system specifies 
the following requirements: minimum acceptable unreliability θ1 with a corresponding 
consumer risk β and a delivery date. The test time up to the delivery date, Tmax hours, can be 
extremely long (upwards of 8,000 hours) to meet a reliability requirement so a specific model 
and test equipment have been developed [6] and are described under sections 3, 4 and 5 of 
this paper. Test strategies involving concerning Tmax , Tave and the best times to run a 
demonstration for military avionics are presented in sections 6 and 7. In section 8, an optimal 
testing strategy is considered.  
 
The model for software reliability demonstration for safety-critical systems is based on the 
Balls and Urn model of software reliability [7], the TRW software reliability theory [8], the 
SRST method for software reliability demonstration and the Test-Analyse-And-Fix (TAAF) 
concept [9].  
 
3. MODEL ELEMENTS: THE BALLS AND URN MODEL 
 
The Balls and Urn model for software reliability includes two components. The urn represents 
a software program and balls represent all the possible input values to the software; white 
balls represent inputs which cause the software to function properly and black balls represent 
inputs which cause the software to fail. According to TRW Software Reliability Theory, the 
software reliability of a computer program is the probability that the software will not fail on 
some input case from a given input distribution. Applying this definition to the Balls and Urn 
model, the software reliability of a program becomes the proportion of white balls in the urn 
and conversely, the software unreliability becomes the proportion of black balls. Therefore it 
is possible to estimate the software reliability by randomly selecting balls from the urn, 
recording their colors and returning them to the urn. If the program is executed a large 
number of times with random inputs from this distribution (the operational profile of the 
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software), the observed reliability will converge to the operational reliability of the software.  
The model for reliability demonstration of safety critical systems by statistical testing is based 
on the Balls and Urn Model with some changes and additions: 
1. The reliability of a system is the probability that it will not fail during one mission or 
demand, according to the system's type. 
2. Each ball represents a trajectory of input values to the software, or a whole 
mission/demand. Therefore the software is tested with randomly selected mission 
cycles/demands. 
3. The random selection applies not only to input data values, but also to their sequence and 
timing within each cycle/demand, as well as to the total length of each mission cycle demand. 
4. The black balls represent mission profiles/demands which lead to failures. Upon finding 
such a failure that mission cycle/demand is stopped, and another started. 
5. The purpose of the reliability demonstration is to demonstrate a certain reliability with a 
certain confidence level, with or without any failures. Therefore, it is a process of one or more 
testing cycles, and not a "one-shot" test. It may or may not have a time limit. 
The purpose of the model is to find the optimal testing policy for reliability demonstration 
testing, according to minimum testing time, maximum probability of success or minimum 
cost. The same model can be used for dependability demonstration, provided only 
catastrophic failures are taken into account. 
Figure 1 is a schematic description of the Balls and Urn model elements for an avionics 
system. The relevant features of the system and its development environment are the 
mission/demand duration distribution, the operational profile of the system, the time required 
to fix the software and produce a new version, including regression testing and the estimated 
failure rate of the software. 
The Mission Profile Generator simulates the system's inputs, and its outputs are fed to the 
Oracle and recorded by the Monitor where:  
• The Mission Profile Generator is a real-time software system, which use the operational 
profile, the mission/demand duration distribution and a pseudo-random generator to 
produce random mission profiles/demands.  These mission profiles are fed to the avionics 
system and to the Oracle, and recorded by the Monitor.  The generated mission profiles 
have random length and random inputs, and these inputs are also randomly timed and 
sequenced. 
 
• The Oracle is a real-time system, which examines the inputs and the outputs of the safety-
critical system, and perfectly detects any failures.  Its function depends, of course, on a 
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prior definition of all possible failures.  The Oracle receives the system's inputs from the 
MPG, and the system's outputs directly from the system itself. 
 
• The Monitor is a real-time software system, which continuously records all the inputs and 
the outputs of the system, in order to enable debugging in case of finding a failure.  The 
monitor receives the system's inputs from the MPG, and the system's outputs directly 
from the system itself. 
 
4. MODEL ELEMENTS: THE TRW MODEL AND THE SRST 
 
4.1 The TRW Model 
 
The assumptions of the TRW Model are: 
1. θ is unknown.  
2. All the tests are s-independent, and represent full mission cycles of the system. 
3. The contract does not specify α nor the corresponding θ0.  
It is derived as follows. The probability of success of a single test is 1-θ. Therefore the 
probability of success of n independent tests is (1-θ)n, and the probability of at least one 
failure in n tests is 1-(1-θ)n. If no failures are found during n tests then the probability that θ is 
larger than any required θ1 is  
β=(1-θ1)n  (reference [8]) 
For any given β and n, θ1 is the (1-β) upper confidence bound on θ. The required number of 
tests with no failures for any given values of θ1 and β is the integer solution of: 
n=ln(β)/ln(1-θ1) 
The same kind of reasoning can be applied to any number of failures, F:  
j
F
=
∑
0
 nCj. (1-θ1)n-j .θ1j ≤β  j=0,1,2....F and  nCj= n!/(j!(n-j)!)             (1) 
The required number of tests for any given β,θ1 and F is the smallest n which satisfies (1).  
Numerical solutions for equation (1) have been calculated and are tabulated in Table 1. Three 
alternative empirical formulae also have been used for comparison with Table 1 and are 
discussed in [6]. Each method gives similar results. 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1: The required number of tests for various values of θ1 and c and F=0-10 
Note: only n<100,000 have been included. 
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c=0.90 
θ1/F 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0.1 22 38 52 65 78 91 104 116 128 140 152 
0.05 45 77 105 132 158 184 209 234 258 282 306 
0.01 230 388 531 667 798 926 1051 1175 1297 1418 1538 
0.005 460 777 1063 1335 1597 1853 2105 2352 2597 2839 3079 
0.001 2302 3889 5321 6679 7992 9273 10530 11769 12993 14204 15404
0.0001 23025 38896 53222 66806 79934 92745      
 
c=0.95 
θ1/F 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0.1 29 46 61 76 89 103 116 129 142 154 167 
0.05 59 93 124 153 181 208 234 260 286 311 336 
0.01 299 473 628 773 913 1049 1182 1312 1441 1568 1693 
0.005 598 947 1258 1549 1829 2100 2362 2627 2884 3138 3389 
0.001 2995 4742 6294 7752 9151 10511 11840 13146 14432 15702 16959
0.0001 29956 47437 62956 77535 91533       
 
c=0.99 
θ1/F 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0.1 44 64 81 97 113 127 142 156 170 183 197 
0.05 90 130 165 198 229 259 288 316 344 371 398 
0.01 459 662 838 1001 1157 1307 1453 1596 1736 1874 2010 
0.005 919 1325 1678 2006 2318 2618 2910 3196 3476 3752 4024 
0.001 4603 6636 8403 10042 11601 13105 14567 15996 17398 18779 20140
0.0001 46050 66381 84057         
 
c=0.995 
θ1/F 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0.1 51 72 90 106 122 137 152 167 181 195 209 
0.05 104 146 182 216 248 279 309 338 367 395 423 
0.01 528 740 924 1094 1256 1411 1562 1709 1853 1995 2135 
0.005 1058 1483 1852 2192 2515 2826 3128 3422 3711 3995 4274 
0.001 5296 7427 9271 10974 12590 14146 15655 17129 18573 19993 21393
0.0001 52981 74299 92735         
 
c=0.999 
θ1/F 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0.1 66 89 108 126 143 159 175 190 205 220 235 
0.05 135 181 220 257 291 324 356 387 417 447 476 
0.01 688 920 1119 1302 1475 1640 1801 1957 2110 2259 2407 
0.005 1379 1843 2242 2608 2954 3286 3607 3919 4225 4525 4820 
0.001 6905 9230 11225 13058 14789 16450 18056 19620 21150 22651 24127
0.0001 69075 92331          
 
 
4.2 Determining the SRST 
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SRST is the following steps: 
1. Use Tmax and Tave to calculate nmax. 
2. Find all the possible pairs (n,F) satisfying the above inequality, subject to F=0,1,2,... and 
n ≤ nmax. The largest F is Fmax during nmax tests.  
3. Plot the graph of F=f(n) using the computed (n,F) pairs, the horizontal line F=Fmax and the 
vertical line n= nmax. These graphs divide the n-F plane into three areas: 
5. F>Fmax:     reject the software. 
6. F≤Fmax and to the left of F=f(n):  continue testing. 
7. F≤Fmax and to the right of F=f(n):  accept the software. 
Example: For β=0.05, θ1=0.001, Tmax=12,000 hours, Tave=1 hour, nmax =Tmax/Tave=12,000 
Table 2 gives the relevant (n,F) pairs, found by numerical methods. 
Table 2: (n,F) pairs   
F 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
N 2995 4742 6294 7752 9151 10511 11840 13146 
 
Therefore Fmax=6 and the precise nmax is 11,840. Figure 2 is the graphical decision aid. The 
required reliability can be demonstrated by any of the above (n,F) pairs, e.g. 2995 tests with 0 
failures, or 4742 tests with 1 failure, etc. 
 
The probability of accepting the product is the probability of finding Fmax or less failures in n 
tests, where (Fmax,n) is any integer point on the acceptance line. Therefore it can be calculated 
by: 
β(θ,n)= (1-θ)nθj nCj
j
F
=
∑
0
max
and the power of the test is: 
power(θ,n)=1-β(θ)=1- (1-θ)nθj nCj
j
F
=
∑
0
max
For the SRST, since the acceptance line was calculated according to the cumulative binomial 
probability formula, for a given θ, the power of the test does not change along the acceptance 
line. For a given pair (Fmax,n), the power of the test increases very rapidly with θ. For the 
specified value of θ1, the calculated consumer’s risk, β(θ1), is identical to the required value, 
0.05. 
 
4.3 A comparison of PRST and SRST 
 
Statistical testing is based on the concept of hypothesis testing. In the simplest case the null 
hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis are as follows: 
H0: θ≤θ1 
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H1: θ>θ1 
There are two types of errors associated with hypothesis testing [10]: 
1. Type I error: H0 is true, but it is rejected following the test. The probability of this error is 
denoted by α and is known as the level of significance of the test. 
2. Type II error: H0 is false, but it is accepted following the test. The probability of this error 
is denoted by β, and 1-β is known as the power of the test. 
Both α and β are functions of the real, unknown θ, and should be minimised. For a given 
sample size (n), a decrease in one type of error leads to an increase in the other type. In fact, 
for a simple one-tailed test, β(θ)=1-α(θ), and the only way to simultaneously decrease both 
types of error is to increase the sample size.  
The calculations below are based on the following data: θ1=0.001, θ0=0.0005, α=β=0.05, for 
which the PRST graphical aid is depicted in Figure 3. 
For a given θ, the power of the test changes only slightly along the acceptance line for 
different pairs of (Fmax, n). For a given pair F, the power of the test increases very rapidly with 
θ. For the specified value of θ1, the calculated consumer risk β(θ1) is 0.00276 which is much 
better than the required value, 0.05. This applies to any combination of α, β, θ0, θ1 and has 
been reported in previous works such as [11], [12], [13], [14].  
 
SRST can be regarded as a combination of sequential testing and fixed-duration testing, since 
the required reliability can be demonstrated at the end of one of several fixed-duration 
periods, corresponding to different numbers of failures.  SRST is better than PRST because of 
the following reasons: 
1.   The law of parsimony: SRST requires only two parameters, β and θ1, instead of four in 
PRST.  
2.  Efficiency: For reasonable values of α and θ0 in the PRST method, the required number 
of tests for any given number of allowable failures is smaller according to the SRST 
method. Therefore, for software which is good enough, SRST requires less time and costs 
less. 
3. Probability of success: The use of Fmax as the rejection criterion, instead of a second line, 
parallel to the acceptance criterion line, makes SRST more liberal than PRST in cases 
when the failure density is larger at the beginning of the tests and decreases later. 
Therefore the probability of success is larger in SRST.  
4. Truncation criteria: in PRST the “truncation criteria”, Fmax, and nmax, are derived from 
real-life constraints, i.e. a deadline or the time allocated to the reliability demonstration, 
and therefore cannot be very large, as is often the case with PRST.     
5. The SRST method is simpler to understand and to implement than the PRST method, and 
it does not require a graphical decision rule.   
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6. Although the power of the SRST method is always smaller, it does satisfy the required 
consumer’s risk criterion. 
For the PRST, All in all, using SRST for reliability demonstration of safety-critical systems is 
much better than using the standard PRST method, both from the producer’s and the 
consumer’s point of view.  The PRST has attributes not available to the SRST; namely the 
Operating Characteristic (OC) function and the average sample number (ASN) used as aids to 
define appropriate tests. However, for SRST, the two parameters, β and θ1 are defined early 
on in a contract allowing enough time to determine the appropriate SPRT from table 1. 
  
4.4 Duration and probability of success 
 
In order to demonstrate the superiority of the SRST method in terms of its expected duration 
and probability of success a simulation was used. The simulation was based on the 
assumption that the time between failures is exponentially distributed. Three values of real 
unreliability were used: 0.0005, 0.001 and 0.002. For each of these values 100 different 
failure-trajectories were simulated, and then examined according to the PRST and SRST 
decision rules. In order to compare the two methods a truncated PRST method had to be 
designed. For a given number of tests as one of the truncation criteria, nmax, the second 
truncation criterion, Fmax, can be calculated from the following formula [12]: 
nmax=(1/2θ0)χ2(1-α),2Fmax 
For nmax=6300 tests, the maximum allowable number of failures according to the SRST 
method is 2. According to the PRST method, the maximum number of failures on the 
rejection line is 7. The results of the simulation are listed in Table 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The probability of success and the expected number of tests for both methods 
Method θ PRST SRST 
Probability of success  0.08 0.47 
Mean number of tests to accept 0.0005 5889 tests 4160 tests 
Mean number of tests to reject  6230 tests 3123 tests 
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Probability of success  0.01 0.11 
Mean number of tests to accept 0.001 5889 tests 3753 tests 
Mean number of tests to reject  5335 tests 2550 tests 
Probability of success  0.00 0.00 
Mean number of tests to accept 0.002 * * 
Mean number of tests to reject  3022 tests 1527 tests 
 
• Since the probability of success is zero, the mean number of tests to accept is 
meaningless. 
 
5. MODEL ELEMENTS: THE TEST-ANALYSE-AND-FIX APPROACH 
 
Any reliability demonstration test procedure, whether for hardware or software systems, can 
either succeed or fail.  If it fails, there is no use in testing another item, because it will 
probably suffer from the same design fault(s). 
However, there is a significant difference between hardware reliability demonstration and 
software reliability demonstration.  For hardware systems, the time required for analysing a 
failure and fixing the relevant fault(s) is relatively long.  Consequently, failing a hardware 
reliability demonstration usually means, that the product will not be supplied on time, or that 
it will not meet its required reliability figure.  On the other hand, for software systems the 
required time for analysing a failure and fixing the relevant fault(s) is relatively short.  
Therefore, while hardware reliability demonstration should be considered as a Go/No-Go or 
“One-Shot” procedure, software reliability demonstration should be considered as a multi-
stage process: Test, Analyse, and Fix. 
The Test-Analyse-And-Fix (TAAF) approach was adopted by the US Air Force as part of its 
R&M 2000 (Reliability and Maintainability) policy [9].  TAAF is a disciplined process for 
systematically detecting and eliminating design weaknesses while simulating the operational 
environment of hardware systems, in an iterative closed-loop manner.  The TAAF process is a 
development strategy, and not a reliability demonstration testing, according to the specific 
contract. 
Combining the TAAF approach with the SRST method for software reliability demonstration 
overcomes the single disadvantage of SRST.  Whenever too many failures are found at the 
beginning of the test period, the SRST testing will be stopped, and will be resumed with a 
new software version.  The SRST of the new version will not take into account the results of 
the previous tests, because it is a different product.  The only problem now is, how to 
determine the best course of action, once a failure has been found: continue testing or fix the 
software. 
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Based on the SRST method and the TAAF approach, the optimal testing policy is a 
continuous decision rule.  The testing policy uses (a) the number of missions testing with the 
current version of the software, (b) the number of failures found in this version, and (c) the 
time left till the deadline, to select one of the following options: 
• Continue testing. 
• Stop testing- the required reliability has been demonstrated. 
• Stop testing- the reliability demonstration has failed. 
• Stop testing, fix the software and start testing all over again later on, with a corrected 
version of the software.  The testing of the new version starts from the beginning, and 
does not take into account the results of the previous versions. 
 
In the typical testing policy of figure 2, the upper inclined line goes through all the break-
even points (n, F) between the 'continue' option and the 'fix' option.  In fact, it replaces the 
producer's risk line in the PRST method. 
The only disadvantage of SRST in comparison with PRST is that for systems, which are not 
adequate, the number of tests could be larger than in PRST. This disadvantage is compensated 
by the above advantages, and may be eliminated altogether by incorporating the Test Analyse 
And Fix (TAAF) approach into SRST. 
 
6. METHODS FOR IMPROVING THE CALCULATED RELIABILITY OR SHORTENING 
THE TESTING DURATION 
 
6.1 Simultaneous testing of several systems 
 
In cases when: (1) the mission duration is relatively long; (2) the reliability requirements, i.e. 
and/or c, are relatively high; and (3) the available time for reliability demonstration is 
relatively short, the required testing duration is simultaneous testing of N identical systems.  
Since all the systems have exactly the same software, n tests on one system are equivalent to 
n/N tests on each of N identical systems, carried at the same time.  This means that the testing 
duration can be divided by N. 
However, this method requires N systems, N oracles, N Mission-Profile Generators and N 
Monitors.  In the aerospace domain the most problematic element is, of course, the avionics 
system itself, because of the following reason: 
• Due to its severe environmental operating regime, an avionics systems is bound to cost 
much more than the other elements, which are not air-borne. 
• The avionics system is, by definition, very special-purpose.  On the other hand, the 
other elements.  i.e. The Oracle, the Monitor and the Mission Profile Generator, are 
usually more general-purpose nature.  This means that they may be used by other 
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projects, provided the appropriate software and hardware interfaces are replaced, and 
therefore their availability may be better. 
Software reliability demonstration tests will typically take place before the beginning of mass 
production of the avionics system.  Therefore the only available units at this stage are either 
prototypes or part of a very small pre-production batch.  At this stage it makes no sense to 
produce more than a handful of units, for the following purposes: 
1. Software reliability demonstration. 
2. Hardware reliability demonstration, including Environmental stress screening (ESS) and 
Qualification tests (vibration, thermal. humidity, electrical, etc.). 
3. Flight tests and narrow sample flights. 
Hardware reliability demonstration tests examine the avionics system's endurance to its 
operational environmental regime throughout its lifetime.  Some of the tests, such as EMP 
(Electro-Magnetic Pulse) and RFI (Radio Frequency Interference) endurance, may even be 
destructive.  Therefore the units which have been subjected to these tests are not airworthy, 
and cannot be used for flight tests. 
However, if the hardware qualification tests and ESS tests, which are usually much shorter 
than the software reliability tests (due to accelerated life-testing), are scheduled after the 
software reliability demonstration, then all the prototypes and pre-production units may be 
used for software reliability demonstration, which should be non-destructive.  After this 
phase, some of the units would be assigned to ESS/Qualification tests, and some of them to 
flight tests/Narrow Sample flights. 
The cost and the special-purpose nature of avionics systems will usually limit N to a very 
small number, which will very rarely be more than 10. 
 
6.2 Accelerated testing 
 
Another method of shortening the testing duration, which is much less straight-forward than 
simultaneous testing of N units, is accelerated software testing ([15], [16], [17]), which is 
based on the accelerated life testing of hardware systems. 
In the software domain, the only possible analogue to “stress” is the input distribution to the 
software system.  According to the software reliability demonstration model, each ball 
represents a whole mission cycle, comprising a trajectory of inputs to the system's software.  
Each trajectory comprises random data values, input sequence and time gaps between any two 
consequent inputs.  The inputs to a system can be classified to the following categories: 
1. Periodical inputs 
1.1. Discrete, digital or analogue inputs, which are periodically sampled by the software. 
1.2. Digital messages, which are periodically transmitted by external systems. 
2. On-event inputs 
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2.1 Discrete, digital or analogue inputs, which are generated by external systems, 
including human operators, and interrupt the normal sequence of the software. 
2.2 Digital messages, which are transmitted “on-event” by external systems, and 
interrupt the normal sequence of the programme. 
The suggested procedure for accelerated software reliability testing requires: 
• Increasing the periodical transmission frequency of digital messages by external 
systems. 
• Increasing the frequency of on-event inputs from external systems. 
• Increasing the frequency of on-event digital messages from internal systems. 
All these changes may be implemented in the Mission Profile Generator. 
Accelerated software reliability testing does not include increasing the frequency of periodical 
sampling by the system itself, because it would require changing the operational software 
itself. 
When all these inputs are accelerated by the same factor, A, the accelerated mission profile 
comprises all the inputs which the system would encounter in a “regular” mission profile, in 
the correct sequence, but with smaller time gaps between the inputs. 
Now instead of testing the software during n mission profiles, one may test it for only n/A 
mission profiles, and calculate the system's accelerated reliability according to the accelerated 
mission profile.  In order to be able to adopt the accelerated reliability figure as a “normal” 
reliability figure, the following assumptions are required: 
1. The real-time system would fail only to its inputs. 
2. Subjecting a real-time system to more frequent inputs cannot improve its reliability.  
The first assumption means, that without any external inputs, the software can work 
indefinitely, without any failure.  In order to increase the confidence in this assumption, one 
could test one of the units without any external inputs, except for those which are absolutely 
needed for the system's operation.  In order to demonstrate that the software is insensitive to 
the length of the mission, this unit may be tested by one very long continuous mission profile.  
It should never fail. 
The second assumption means, that more frequent inputs tend to “stress” the software, and 
hence the probability of failure can either remain constant or increase, but it can never 
decrease.  It also means, that once the software has been subjected to a trajectory of inputs, 
which cause it to fail, the prompt arrival of new inputs cannot prevent its failure.  In order to 
increase the confidence in this assumption, one could test one of the units with non-
accelerated inputs, and compare the results of both kinds of tests.  The results of the non-
accelerated test should be at least as good as the results of the accelerated tests, at a 
confidence level corresponding to c (the required confidence level in 1-θ).  Therefore, the 
result of accelerated software reliability tests is a conservative estimate of the real software 
reliability. 
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 6.3 Practical limitations in the aerospace domain 
 
1. Any avionics system's hardware cannot deal with periodical inputs whose frequency is 
above a certain threshold.  This constraint is more typical of digital input messages. 
2. The Mission Profile Generator, being based on a more user-friendly hardware and 
software than the avionics system, may have even more severe limitations on the 
maximum frequency of simulated inputs to the avionics system. 
Due to the characteristic short time factors associated with airborne platforms, it would be 
very rare to achieve an accelerating factor in excess of 10 in any real-time avionics system.  
However, using accelerated testing as well as simultaneous testing of several units, one may 
shorten the testing duration by a factor of up to 100, which is quite significant. 
 
6.4 Parallel versions 
 
The third method of shortening the duration of software reliability demonstration has more to 
do with increasing the probability of success than with actually shortening the testing 
duration. 
Whenever the penalty for failing to demonstrate the required reliability is large enough, and 
the number of allowable failures is at least one, it may be worthwhile to assign two or more 
teams of software professionals to the project once a failure is found.  While the first team 
continues to test the first version of the software, trying to demonstrate its reliability with the 
current number of failures, the second team produces a new version, and starts testing it from 
the beginning.  Now there are two parallel versions, which are simultaneously tested.  When a 
failure is found in either version, a third version may be created and tested in parallel, etc.  
This method requires at least two units of the tested systems, and at least two complete testing 
set-ups.  The labour cost of this option is, of course, much higher than in the case of a single 
version.  Moreover, the development of several parallel software versions in this manner 
represents a challenge to the software configuration control programme.  Therefore it may be 
justified only in certain cases, depending on the penalty cost. 
 
6.5 Using additional information 
 
In certain circumstances, the Error Seeding Model may increase the confidence in the results 
of the reliability demonstration testing, both quantitatively and qualitatively.  Let us assume 
that the reliability demonstration testing is carried out independently on two different 
versions: the original version (installed in one of N units), and a “seeded” version, installed in 
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only one unit.  The seeded version contains s known errors, each of them leading to failures, 
given the right trajectories. 
In order to use the Error Seeding Model, the seeded errors have to represent the unknown 
errors, such that the probabilities of finding both kinds of errors would be similar.  The best 
way of doing it is not to “invent” the seeded errors, but to use actual errors, which have been 
discovered and corrected during the software development and testing process. 
Let us assume, that at the end of the reliability demonstration testing, the required reliability 
of the original version, θ1, has been demonstrated with the required confidence level, c, 
without any failure.  At the same time, the testing of the “seeded version” has revealed j≤s of 
the seeded faults. 
According to the TRW formula, the probability that the reliability is smaller than θ1 is at least 
c.  On the other hand, according to the error seeding model, the probability that the seeded 
version does not contain any indigenous faults is at least j/(s+1).  But if the seeded version has 
no indigenous faults then neither does the original version, which means that its reliability is 
0.  Hence, whenever j/(s+1)>c, one can conclude that the confidence level in θ1 is not c, but 
j/(s+1), which is greater.  Obviously, s must be a few dozens and j must be very close to s in 
order for this inequality to apply.  For example, for θ1=0.001, n=3,000 and s=29, the 
calculated c is 0.95.  If at the same time, all the 29 seeded errors have been found (j=29), then 
c can be increased to 29/30=0.966, which is a little better. 
When j=s, the confidence in the results of the reliability demonstration testing is increased 
even further, though only qualitatively, because it indicates that both the testing process 
(MPG and Oracle) and the number of tests are very effective. 
The Error Seeding method has another useful benefit: it may have a positive psychological 
effect on the testing effort, especially prior to the reliability demonstration phase [18]. 
 
6.6 Necessary conditions for using the model 
6.6.1 Reliability requirements and mission duration 
6.6.1.1 Single unit, non-accelerated testing 
 
The total time required for reliability demonstration with no failures is given by: 
T0=n0Tave=[ln(1-c)]/[ln(1-θ1)]Tave. 
Therefore Treq increases for larger values of c, smaller values of θ1 and larger values of Tave.  
In practice, the total time assigned to software reliability demonstration of a safety-critical 
avionics system may be several months.  It would be longer if the tests continue throughout 
the flight tests period (from a few weeks to a few months), and longer still if they continue 
throughout the Narrow Sample period (a few months).  The total time available may be 
calculated using the following assumptions: 
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1. The maximum calendar time available is 6 months until the flight tests begin and 12 
months until the system is operationally deployed in the aircraft. 
2. The tests are fully automated and are carried out 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 
Hence the total time available for testing is between 4,380-8,760 hours. 
Since the typical mission duration of a modern fighter aircraft, without refuelling, is one hour, 
then without using several units and accelerated testing, the maximum number of tests is 
4,380 or 8,760.  Using the TRW formula, the smallest unreliability values which can be 
demonstrated for common values of c, with no failures, are as follows: 
C 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.995 0.999 
θ1 0.00026 0.00034 0.00052 0.00060 0.00079 
 
For the typical value of θ1=0.001, the maximum number of failures can be: 
C 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.995 0.999 
Fmax 4 3 2 1 0 
 
For Tave=2 hours, for instance, the required testing duration is doubled, and the minimum 
values of θ1 are also doubled. 
 
6.6.1.2 Several units, accelerated testing 
 
Testing N units and accelerating the tests by a factor of A, the total time required is given by: 
Treq=[ln(1-c)]/[ln(1-θ1)]Tave/AN. 
Clearly, Treq decreases for larger values of A and N. 
Using only 5 units and accelerating the tests by a factor of 2, one can either demonstrate the 
same reliability with a 10 times shorter test duration, or demonstrate 10 times lower reliability 
requirements with the same test duration.  In these circumstances, it would be practical to 
require every 10-5 as the target unreliability. 
 
6.6.2 Correction time, reliability requirements and mission duration 
 
The model can only be used when Tcorr, the time needed for producing a new software 
version, is smaller than the difference Tmax-T0 (a function of θ1, c and Tave).  Otherwise there 
is no point in fixing the software, for there would not be enough time left for testing the new 
version. 
 
7. WHEN IS THE BEST TIME FOR A RELIABILITY/DEPENDABILITY 
DEMONSTRATION? 
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7.1 The various options 
 
Software Dependability Demonstration (SDD) is usually going to take a few months.  (For 
example, a failure-free demonstration of 0.999 dependability with 95% confidence would 
require 3,000 mission cycles).  Since it is a prerequisite for the full-scale deployment of a 
safety-critical software system, the scheduling of software dependability demonstration 
testing within the software development process is very important.  Software dependability 
demonstration must never begin before the successful completion of all the deterministic 
software testing, usually by the software development team, and of all the hardware testing.  
From this stage the software system must successfully complete three different activities: 
• Software dependability demonstration. 
• Flight tests. 
• Narrow sample flights: (After flight testing the new operational software system and 
before installing it in all the relevant aircraft, the software is installed in a small number of 
operational aircraft for a predetermined period of time (several months).  During this time 
this software is experienced by many operational air-crews, sometimes with a few 
operational limitations.  The purpose of the narrow sample flights is to locate any 
remaining faults, and to approve or disapprove of installing the new software in all the 
aircraft). 
The scheduling of these activities must obey the following constraints: 
• Narrow sample flights cannot begin before the successful completion of flight tests, 
and it is always the last activity prior to full-scale deployment.  The main reason for 
scheduling flight tests before the narrow sample flights is that the software may contain 
embarrassing or even dangerous faults, and therefore should be tested first by 
experienced test pilots under controlled conditions.  However, flight tests cannot 
replace narrow sample flights, because they are very expensive, while narrow sample 
flights are virtually free (they are part of the routine flights of operational squadrons). 
• Software dependability demonstration may take place before flight tests, after flight 
tests or in parallel with flight tests; and before or in parallel with narrow flights. 
In view of the above constraints there are 5 possible ways of scheduling these 3 activities: 
1. Software Dependability Demonstration, Flight Tests, Narrow Sample. 
2. Flight Tests, Software Dependability Demonstration, Narrow Sample. 
3. Flight Tests, Software Dependability Demonstration in parallel with Narrow Sample. 
4. Flight Tests in parallel with Software Dependability Demonstration, Narrow Sample. 
5. Software Dependability Demonstration in parallel with Flight Tests and later with Narrow 
Sample. 
 
7.2 Guidelines to the optimal option according to various criteria 
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 The scheduling of SDD, flight tests and narrow sample flights may be subject to various 
constraints, such as time to operational deployment, total budget and the number of available 
units.  It may also be optimised according to various criteria, part of which are listed below. 
• Minimum total time till operational deployment 
According to this “success-oriented” approach, the best options are option3 and option 5, 
because both of them perform the lengthy SDD in parallel with the other long phase, i.e. 
narrow sample flights.  However, both methods need a larger number of units, and their 
probability of success at the first attempt is relatively low.  In order to choose between these 
two options one has to compare the benefit of the lower probability of failing the SDD in 
option 3 with the benefit of the lower probability of failing the narrow sample flights in 
option 5. 
• Minimum number of units 
When this is the paramount consideration, one has to choose among options 1 and 2, since 
option is clearly inferior, both in terms of its probability of success and its minimum total 
time.  Usually option 1 should be preferred to option 2, since the higher probability of success 
of its flight tests phase means lower expected total cost than in option 2. 
• Minimum expected cost 
Since the most expensive phase by far is the flight tests phase, the best option according to 
this criterion is option 1.  In all the other options, the flight tests phase is the first phase in the 
schedule. 
• Maximum probability of success at first trial 
The best options according to this criterion are option 1 and 2.  In order to select between 
these two options one should estimate the probabilities of success of each of the three phases 
in both options. 
• Minimum expected time 
Since the SDD and the narrow sample phases are much longer than the flight tests phase, the 
best option according to this criterion would be option 2, in which the probabilities of success 
of these phases is higher. 
 
9. A GENERAL TESTING STRATEGY 
 
An optimal testing policy is a testing policy, which yields the minimum testing time or cost 
till success, or the maximum probability of success. 
A safety-critical system is planned to undergo statistical testing in order to demonstrate its 
reliability in terms of  (θ1, c), i.e. that the probability that its unreliability is larger than θ1, is 
small than 1-c.  The time allocated to the reliability is Tmax hours.  In some cases, Tmax=∞ and 
the maximum allowable number of failures is zero.  This situation can arise, for example, 
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when a safety-critical system is scheduled to go on its first operational mission immediately 
after its reliability has been demonstrated. Tmax hours correspond to nmax mission cycles, of 
Tave duration time: nmax=Tmax/Tave. 
According to the SRST reliability demonstration method, this requirement can be met by a 
infinite number of pairs (n,F), with n mission cycles and F failures found, according to the 
following formula: 
1-  nCj. (1-θ1)n-j .θ1j ≥c  F=0,1,2....F, n≤nmax 
j
F
=
∑
0
The required number of tests for any number of failures, F, is the largest integer, nF, satisfying 
this inequality. 
The maximum allowable number of failures during the demonstration, Fmax, is the smallest F 
such that: TF+1=nF+1Tave≥Tmax 
Sometimes there may be a specific requirement to demonstrate the reliability with zero 
failures, that is Fmax=0.  In this case the required number of tests is given by:  
n0=ln(1-c)/ln(1-θ1) 
This requirement may or may not be combined with unlimited testing time. 
Clearly, nmax must be greater than n0 and Tmax must be greater than T0, otherwise the required 
reliability cannot be demonstrated. 
Combining the TAAF approach to the SRST method, the reliability demonstration testing is 
composed of one or more phases, where in each phase a different software version is tested. 
nF  is the required number of tests with no more than F failures in any phase of the reliability 
demonstration testing.  The software reliability demonstration testing can therefore be 
regarded as a process: 
• Test the current version to demonstrate its reliability.  If no failures are found during T0 
hours, stop testing. 
• When the Fth failure is found (F=1,2,…,Fmax), choose between the two following 
options: 
1. Correct the current version to produce a new version and start testing all over again.  This 
option requires that for the new version Tmax≥T0+Tcorr 
2. Continue testing, aiming at TF hours with only F failures, F=1,2…Fmax. 
Because of the time constraint (Tmax), this process can either succeed or fail. 
The maximum number of new versions when any failure is found t hours before the deadline, 
can be calculated as follows: 
Assuming that there is enough time for at least one more version, t-Tcorr is larger than T0, and 
the testing of the first new version will start Tcorr hours after finding the failure.  If the first 
failure in the new version is found immediately, then the testing of the second new version 
will start at least 2Tcorr hours after finding the original failure.  Similarly, the testing of the 
Vth new version will start at least VTcorr hours after finding the original failure.  The only 
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constraint is that the time left, t-VTcorr, is still larger than T0.  Therefore, the maximum 
number of new versions is the integer solution of: 
t-VmaxTcorr≥T0 
Vmax=int[(t-T0)/Tcorr] 
Sometimes a penalty cost, Pc, may apply if the reliability demonstration fails.  The penalty 
cost can be, for example, the cost of a lost contract or tender, or a specific penalty payment on 
failing to supply the software with the required reliability on time. 
 
8.3.5 Optimal testing policies 
The model enables one to calculate the optimal testing policies in various cases, such as: 
1. Fmax=0, Tmax=∞: the system is required for an operational mission, whose dates hasn't 
been determined yet.  The intuitive policy is to stop testing after the first failure, 
whenever it happens, and fix the fault. 
2. Fmax=0, Tmax≠∞: the software is required for an operational mission, whose date has been 
determined.  In this case there is no intuitive policy, 
3. Fmax≥0, Tmax≠∞ and the software is required for operational use, but not for a specific 
operational mission.  This is the most general case of the model. Again, there is no 
intuitive policy. 
4. Fmax≥0, Tmax≠∞ and there is a financial penalty, Pc, on failing to demonstrate the required 
reliability.  In this case, the optimal policy may be parallel development of two or more 
software versions. 
Formulation and solution of these optimisation problems using the SRST and TAAF approach 
is based on the notion of break-even points. For every failure found, the optimal policy is to 
continue testing if the time left is smaller than the break-even point value, and stop testing if 
the time left is larger than this value. The values of the various break-even points can be 
found by stochastic dynamic programming and are discussed in [19]. 
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Figure 1: A Simplified Oracle 
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 Figure 2. A graphical decision rule for SRST 
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 Figure 3. A graphical decision rule for PRST 
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